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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 
To shift our concentration from matters of internal organization to those of the 
political setting moves us toward a long-needed reintegration between professional 
analysis of regulatory administration and the liveliest currents of general empirical 
political theory. Among the latter currents, one of the most promising consists of 
Theodore J. Lowi's categorization of policies and related political processes into 
distributive, regulatory, constituency, and redistributive types. According to Lowi, 
each of these types carries with it a distinctive pattern of political activity. In the 
legislative arena, for example, he finds that regulatory measures are much more 
amended on the floor of both House and Senate than those of the other 
types - and that this is irrespective of whether the President at the time is known 
as "strong" or "weak." One of the many intriguing possible implications of Lowi's 
study is that we could purposely design policy structures to produce desired 
patterns of politics, or avoid undesired patterns: regulatory approaches to policy 
will activate Congress; distributive approaches to policy dampen public involve- 
ment. Contra much conventional wisdom (which has tended to think in President 
versus Congress terms), presidential ascendancy in policy development is not 
universal in fact and is not a panacea in principle. Active regulatory development is 
likely to be associated with both strong presidential leadership and significant 
congressional contributions to the shaping of policy. 
The politics of policy structures, which Lowi's conceptualization opens up for 
us, leads us to a more fundamental lev-i of analysis, one that encourages us to relate 
regulatory questions to the larger political arena in novel ways. And if we can break 
down the isolation of regulatory studies from general political analysis, we will have 
taken a significant step toward strengthening the contribution of academic political 
science to important governmental problems. 
Michael D. Reagan 
University of California at Riverside 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY PERFORMANCE: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE ASH COUNCIL REPORT 
Roger C. Cramton, Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States 
On February 11, 1971, President Nixon re- tive Organization (the Ash Council) entitled "A 
leased a report of his Advisory Council on Execu- New Regulatory Framework - A Report on Se- 
lected Independent Regulatory Agencies."' The 
report recommends far-reaching changes in the This article was originally prepared for delivery at the 
Spring 1971 meeting of the Section on Antitrust Law of structure and regulatory responsibilities of six 
the American Bar Association. It is reproduced here with independent regulatory agencies - the Civil Aero- 




Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Com- 
mission, Interstate Commerce Commission, and 
the Securities and Exchange Commission - and a 
reduction in the size of the Federal Communica- 
tions Commission. The President's accompanying 
statement urged vigorous public discussion of the 
Ash Council's Report and early submission of 
comments and criticism from interested public and 
private groups. 
The purpose of this article is to consider the 
basic premise of the Ash Council Report - that the 
structure of a regulatory agency has a profound 
effect on regulatory performance. This premise 
underlies three general proposals for reform which 
the report advances for broad application in these 
agencies: 
1. The substitution of a single adminsitrator 
for the multi-headed board or commission. 
2. Dramatic changes in the agencies' internal 
decisional process. 
3. Judicial review by a new, nonconstitutional, 
specialized court, rather than the regular courts of 
appeal, or, in the case of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, a special three-judge district court. 
Each of these proposals will be briefly examined. 
Regulatory Structure: The Single Administrator 
The Ash Council recommends that the indepen- 
dent regulatory commissions in the transportation, 
power, securities, and consumer protection fields 
bte transformed into executive agencies headed by 
single administrators responsible to the President. 
The substitution of a single administrator for the 
multi-headed collegial body is the kingpin in the 
Ash Council's whole approach; it is presented 
almost as a universal panacea for the solution of 
the problems of the independent regulatory agen- 
cies. 
The report recounts the advantages of a single 
administrator at great length. These advantages are 
framed in terms of relatively abstract concepts 
such as "accountability," "responsiveness," "ef- 
ficiency," "good management," "expedition," and 
the like. We are told that these virtues, and other 
good things such as improved personnel, will flow 
from the substitution of a single administrator for 
the multi-headed collegial body. All of this is 
somewhat reminiscent of Lewis Carroll's remark 
that "It must be so because you have repeated it 
three times!" 
In the view of the Ash Council, the single 
administrator is godlike, and the multi-headed 
collegial body suffers from a multitude of sins. 
The proposition is not supported by empirical 
evidence, but is asserted as a self-evident, univer- 
sally applicable truth. I am skeptical of an asser- 
tion that seems over broad and that must be taken 
on faith. 
The case that is made for the single adminis- 
trator has a certain surface plausibility. There are 
areas, such as the current development of environ- 
mental standards by the Environmental Protection 
Agency, in which a single administrator reporting 
directly to the President seems likely to do a more 
effective job than a multi-headed board. On the 
other hand, we know that single-minded, strong 
men running very important government opera- 
tions are susceptible of great drawbacks. One 
could refer, in terms of responsiveness as against 
rigidity, to such agencies as the Selective Service 
System under Lewis B. Hershey or the FBI under 
J. Edgar Hoover. 
I am not referring at this point to the quality of 
regulatory performance, but only to the question 
of accountability and responsiveness, to which the 
Ash Council gives great emphasis. Perhaps a more 
crucial question is how the structure of an agency 
affects the performance of its regulatory tasks. I 
am doubtful whether there is any simple relation- 
ship, for reasons elaborated below. 
Criteria for Regulatory Performance 
In order to determine the relationship between 
structure and performance, one must first have a 
consistent notion of what constitutes good 
regulatory performance. What are the criteria for 
judging regulatory performance? The Ash Council 
Report gives us very little help on this question. It 
tends to suggest two criteria: (1) expedition in 
formulating policy and completing proceedings; 
and (2) responsiveness of the agency, particularly 
to signals from the Executive. While important, it 
is hard to accept these criteria as the sole or most 
important ones. 
Expedition, of course, is fine if agencies are 
doing what you want them to do. Some critics 
believe that the combination of all of the transpor- 
tation agencies in a single agency - surely desir- 
able on efficiency grounds-would lead to a 
dominance of current Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission regulatory attitudes and would provide the 
opportunity, now lacking because of intermodal 
competition which the separate agencies are un- 




transportation industries. Under this view, substi- 
tution of a single administrator for transportation 
would be disastrous unless accompanied by legis- 
lative revision of transportation policy, including 
substantial deregulation. 
Criteria for evaluating regulatory performance, 
it is evident, are needed in order to assess proposed 
changes in regulation. Until the goals against which 
regulation is to be measured are determined, it is 
impossible to determine whether or not those 
goals will be achieved by a structural change from 
a multi-headed body to a single administrator.2 
The historical contest between Congress and 
the President for control or isolation of some of 
these regulatory functions needs also to be men- 
tioned at this point. Congress has sought over the 
years to insulate certain regulatory functions from 
Executive control, perhaps enhancing at the same 
time the control of congressional committees over 
those same functions and activities. Organizational 
theory has no good answer for this struggle 
between the Executive and Congress; it is a 
question of politics and government which the 
electorate should decide.3 
Lack of Empirical Evidence 
A second comment is that casual experience 
does not support an unqualified preference for the 
single administrator. One can look around the 
federal government today and find good and bad 
examples of each type of organization, depending 
upon what your own criteria for evaluation are.In 
other words, there is a lack of a factual basis for 
the Ash Council's conclusion that single-headed 
agencies perform better. It is something you have 
to arrive at by a leap of faith, by an intuitive jump. 
The Ash Council Report is a failure as an empirical 
document. 
And yet many of these questions are sus- 
ceptible to examination. It is my impression, for 
example, that the Veterans Administration 
-which is an agency headed by a single adminis- 
trator -has not obtained markedly better per- 
sonnel than the Securities and Exchange Com- 
mission, a multi-headed collegial body. Nor is it 
evident to me that the Comptroller of the Cur- 
rency - again a single administrator - has done a 
more effective job of banking regulation than the 
Federal Reserve Board or the Home Loan Bank 
Board, both of which are multi-headed agencies. 
Further instances are easily found. Is there any 
evidence, for example, that the regulatory func- 
tions of the Departments of Agriculture and 
Interior are performed better than those of the 
independent commissions? Our preoccupation 
with the regulatory functions of the independent 
agencies has blinded us to the fact that there may 
be lots of bodies buried in obscure regulatory 
corners in the executive departments. There are 
other factors which are just as important or more 
important than regulatory structure.4 
Other Plausible Explanations of Regulatory Defects 
Two other plausible explanations of why regu- 
lation has defects must be explored before struc- 
ture can be given the decisive role assigned to it by 
the Ash Council. One alternative theory is that 
many of the problems of regulation are inherent in 
the regulatory task itself, and especially when the 
regulatory task is one of giving out benefits to an 
industry which has constant contact with the 
dispensing agency. If a small group of regulated 
firms have great interest in regulatory activities, 
while the general public is only peripherally or 
marginally affected, it is inevitable that the infor- 
mation, concern, and political clout of the regu- 
lated firms will be effectively communicated to 
the agencies through our political process. Our 
regulatory agencies, regardless of organization, 
tend to be highly responsive to the political 
pressures that are brought to bear upon them. The 
general public, which brings its latent power to 
bear only in situations of failure or catastrophe 
that arouse general concern, has much less interest 
in influencing regulatory decisions. Regulators 
- well aware of the episodic character of public 
interest in regulation - lean over backwards to 
avoid failures of service, dramatic accidents, and 
the like. The pressures of incumbent firms, intent 
upon protecting their franchised positions against 
new competitors or new technology, are often in 
the same direction; they tend to be as cautious in 
approach and as fearful of calamity as the regu- 
lators. It is this community of interest between 
regulators and regulated that is often referred to 
under the rubric of "captive agencies."5 
A second alternative theory is that the observed 
defects of regulation are largely the results of 
inadequate, outmoded, or vague substantive poli- 
cies. Railroad regulation was initially designed to 
restrain the economic power of railroads in an era 
when there were few, if any, competing forms of 
transportation.6 Motor carrier regulation stems 
from a period when competition was viewed as 
undesirable, even for an industry with little or no 
economies of scale.7 Aviation regulation, also 
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reflecting the New Deal era's distrust of market 
forces, seeks to promote air service without regard 
to its effects on other modes.8 Separate agencies 
administer regulatory policies for different modes; 
and subsidies to some modes in the construction 
and maintenance of facilities (especially to water 
and air carriers) are administered by other agencies 
without regard to the effects on unsubsidized 
transportation service. In short, there is no na- 
tional transportation policy but only a melange of 
confused and contradictory protective, promo- 
tional, and regulatory policies. 
While transportation has served here as a 
convenient example, other regulatory fields are 
also characterized by divided authority, outmoded 
policies, and vague standards.9 The confusion of 
agencies and policies in the energy field, for 
example, is widely recognized. It is no accident 
that those agencies with the simplest and most 
widely accepted missions - such as the protection 
of the integrity of the securities markets by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission - are com- 
monly viewed as turning in the best performance. 
The key to regulatory performance, under this 
theory, is to be found not in agency structure but 
in the opportunities or pitfalls inherent in the 
substantive task of regulation. 
It is my personal view that the two alternative 
hypotheses outlined above are, in combination, 
more plausible explanations of regulatory defects 
than the Ash Council's undue emphasis on struc- 
ture. While structure is important, other consider- 
ations are vastly more important. 
Agency Decisional Process 
In addition to the substitution of single admin- 
istrators for most of the present boards and 
commissions, the Ash Council Report proposes a 
dramatic short circuiting of the decisional stages 
now followed by most agencies. The initial de- 
cisions of hearing examiners in adjudicatory cases 
would become final agency decisions unless the 
single administrator, within a fixed period of 30 
days, reversed or modified the initial decision 
because it was inconsistent with agency policy. 
Only a limited opportunity for postponing a final 
decision by remanding a case for further hearing 
would be provided; and it would be subject to a 
further time limit of 30-45 days. 
The ultimate objective, of course, is that of 
expediting the decision of adjudicatory cases. In 
addition, limiting the administrator's ability to 
evolve policy by means of case-by-case adjudica- 
tion would presumably force administrators to 
formulate regulatory policies in general rule- 
making proceedings. Delegating greater decisional 
authority to hearing examiners would have the 
further effect of increasing their status, respon- 
sibility, and - hopefully - performance. Admin- 
istrators, freed from a heavy workload of routine 
controversies, could direct their attention to major 
policy issues. 
While these objectives are laudable ones, it 
seems likely that the Ash Council proposal is more 
procrustean than workable. The choice between 
rule making and adjudication as a method of 
formulating policy is more complicated than the 
Ash Council indicated.0 And a number of agen- 
cies already have gone very far in delegating 
decisional authority in routine cases to hearing 
examiners or to employee boards. 1 Further steps 
along this line might achieve most of the objectives 
sought by this aspect of the Ash Council Report. 
A major factor, not fully considered by the Ash 
Council, is the effect of its shortened decisional 
process on rights of party participation. The fixed 
period of review by the administrator - a review 
presumably limited to questions of general policy 
- would deprive the parties of any participation 
during the final decisional stage. Once the hearing 
examiner came down with his initial decision, 
there would be no exceptions, no briefs, no oral 
arguments. The administrator himself will have 
only 30 days to master - by some mysterious 
process, and without any further assistance from 
the parties - the complexities of the case and to 
reverse, modify, or affirm the decision. 
The consequences of this procedure would be 
unfortunate. Briefs, exceptions, and oral argu- 
ments before an agency crystallize issues, illumi- 
nate the case, and help the agency reach a wiser 
and more informed decision. They also provide 
interested persons with an effective opportunity to 
educate the ultimate deciders. 
Moreover, in many administrative cases, the 
issues develop and change as the case goes along. It 
is not unusual for the decision at the agency level 
to focus on matters that were not emphasized by 
the hearing examiner. In these situations, an 
opportunity to submit briefs and arguments when 
the case is before the agency for final decision may 
be an essential ingredient of fairness. 2 
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Specialized Reviewing Court 
The Ash Council Report proposes the creation 
of a specialized reviewing court, composed of 
judges without life tenure, to review the decisions 
of the transportation, power, and securities agen- 
cies. Once again, the proposal pursues laudable 
goals - here the desire to relieve the federal courts 
of an unnecessary burden and to improve the 
review function. 
An initial problem with the proposal is that it 
would not make a dent in the heavy caseload of 
the federal courts of appeals. The new specialized 
reviewing court would have jurisdiction of cases 
which constitute less than four per cent of the 
present workload of the courts of appeals - a 
miniscule decrease.l3 Other categories of cases, 
especially labor and social security cases, would 
need to be added in order to provide a specialized 
administrative court of review with a caseload that 
would relieve the courts of appeals of a substantial 
burden. 
Moreover, administrative review cases involving 
regulatory action are fairly interesting. They enliv- 
en what is otherwise becoming a rather drab 
appetite of criminal appeals - which constitute 
about one-half of the cases that the United States 
courts of appeals now hear. Federal appellate 
courts will become specialized courts of criminal 
appeals if other cases are withdrawn from their 
jurisdiction. 
. Further, any reconsideration of federal appel- 
late jurisdiction raises questions of priorities. Why 
should administrative appeals from such agencies 
be the cases that are pruned away? These cases 
involve substantial issues of federal law to which 
the courts of appeals have contributed a great deal 
of understanding. There are other classes of cases, 
such as diversity litigation or the tremendous 
burden of habeas corpus petitions involving repeti- 
tive examination of criminal issues that already 
have been tried in state court proceedings, that are 
much more deserving candidates for exclusion 
from the federal courts. 
Wholly apart from these workload consider- 
ations, the creation of specialized courts raises 
complicated problems concerning their role, per- 
sonnel, and the like. The strongest argument for a 
specialized court can be made in areas like labor, 
tax, and trade - areas which cut across the whole 
economy rather than concentrate on a particular 
industry. Several years ago the American Bar 
Association proposed the creation of "administra- 
tive courts" to exercise final administrative author- 
ity in these areas.14 The Ash Council departs from 
these earlier proposals both as to subject matter 
(labor, tax, and trade are areas in which the Ash 
Report does not apply its "administrative court" 
proposal) and as to the nature of the court 
(appellate rather than trial court as in the earlier 
ABA proposals). 
There are dangers in the application of a 
specialized administrative court - whether trial or 
appellate in nature - to one or a few regulated 
industries.15 Where the agency is in the business 
of handing out extremely valuable perquisites, 
grants, licenses, and the like, which have enormous 
effects on the economic fortunes of firms in the 
industry, the dangers of partiality and departures 
from adjudicatory fairness are enlarged. One can 
be sure that industry representatives are going to 
be constantly battling for appointment of special- 
ists who know about and sympathize with their 
problems. The administrative court approach is 
most properly applicable in areas where adjudi- 
cative enforcement functions have a moral quality, 
and where decisions turn on determinations of 
past facts, which are required to be made on the 
basis of a record. In situations of this kind, it may 
make sense to use a specialized tribunal of high 
quality - particularly at the trial stage. 
An independent adjudicatory tribunal, cutting 
across industry lines, also surmounts the separa- 
tion-of-functions problem, which has been em- 
phasized with respect to the Federal Trade Com- 
mission by former FTC Commissioner Elman.16 
There is a legitimate difference of opinion con- 
cerning the significance of the separation-of- 
functions problem in administrative agencies. 
Whatever one may think of the combination of 
adjudicatory and prosecutory functions as a gen- 
eral problem, the objection has the strongest force 
in those agencies, such as the National Labor 
Relations Board and the Federal Trade Com- 
mission, where adjudications typically involve non- 
recurring past events and charges of antisocial 
conduct. Economic regulation that looks to the 
future, that is largely policy oriented, in which a 
wide range of alternatives are considered by 
regulatory bodies, has a very different character; 
and in such proceedings the separation-of- 
functions problem is considerably reduced. The 
Administrative Procedure Act recognizes this dis- 
tinction by exempting rate making and initial 
licensing from its separation-of-functions require- 




ceedings was implicitly recognized in placing the 
prosecutory function in the unfair labor practice 
field in an office independent from the National 
Labor Relations Board. Current demands for a 
similar separation with respect to the Federal 
Trade Commission have not yet been acceded to. 
The Ash Council proposal does not improve the 
separation-of-functions problem in the trade field. 
In fact, it worsens existing difficulties, because, 
instead of a group of five people who can exercise 
a moderating influence upon one another and who 
may not be intimately involved in the earlier stages 
of the case, the Ash Council would substitute a 
single administrator in the trade practices area. 
Since the administrator would be responsible for 
the staff, responsible for the prosecutorial deci- 
sions, and then also responsible for the final 
decision, affected persons are likely to be even 
more fearful than now that the adjudication of 
their cases will be by a prosecutor with a closed 
mind. 17 
Conclusion 
While I am critical of the Ash Council pro- 
posals, my criticism should not be taken as a 
defense of the status quo. Many things need to be 
done to improve the structure, organization, and 
procedures of our federal agencies. In some areas, 
such as transportation, radical surgery may be 
required, including experimentation with a single 
administrator. 8 
The Ash Council has performed a service in 
pointing the finger at important problems and 
suggesting the need for change. The particular 
mechanisms which the Ash Council has recom- 
mended, however, should be not adopted. Inquiry 
into needed changes in the regulatory process 
should not be confined merely to structural or 
organizational matters. There is an even greater 
need for fundamental reexamination of the sub- 
stantive premises and policies of regulation. 
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diversity litigation, which do not involve significant 
questions of federal law. Finally, a new tribunal with 
review authority over the decisions of only a small 
minority of agencies cannot be expected to make the 
contributions to uniformity in administrative law 
which the Ash Council sees as one of the advantages 
of its establishment." 
14. See U.S. Commission on Organization of the Exec- 
utive Branch of Government, Legal Services and 
Procedures, (1955), pp. 84-88;American Bar Associa- 
tion Report, Vol. 81 (1956), pp. 378-379 (Pro- 
ceedings of the House of Delegates); and Minor, 'The 
Administrative Court: Variations on a Theme," Ohio 
State Law Journal, Vol. 19 (1958), p. 380. 
15. The Administrative Conference "Views" on the Ash 
Council Report stated that: 
"There is a danger that a narrowly specialized 
reviewing court, concerned with the actions of only a few industries, might become or give the appearance 
of becoming identified with the agency or industry 




pose a special problem, because, while of vital 
importance to the regulated industry, they would be 
less subject to broad professional and public scrutiny 
than appointments to the courts of appeals." 
16. See P. Elman, "The Regulatory Process: A Personal 
View," BNA Antitrust and Trade Reg. Report No. 
475, D1-D5 (1970); P. Elman, "Administrative Re- 
form of the Federal Trade Commission," Georgia 
Law Journal, Vol. 59 (1971), p. 777. 
17. The Administrative Conference "Views" on the Ash 
Council Report similarly stated that: 
"One traditional ground of attack on the indepen- 
dent regulatory commission, particularly applied to 
enforcement functions of such agencies as the Fed- 
eral Trade Commission, is the charge that unfairness 
to respondents may result when agency heads ex- 
ercise prosecutory and rulemaking functions along 
with that of adjudication. Whatever the merits of this 
charge as a general matter, the concentration of 
regulatory authority in a single administrator in- 
creases at least the appearance, though not neces- 
sarily the reality, of a merger of inconsistent func- 
tions. 
Annual Report, p. 62. 
18. Thus the Administrative Conference "Views" stated 
that: 
"While the Conference is not persuaded that the 
proposed form of agency organization - a single 
administrator responsible to the President - is 
generally superior to the collegial form, it may offer 
advantages in specific areas of regulation, particularly 
where vigorous departures from existing regulatory 
techniques are called for. Whether an existing regu- 
latory framework should or should not be continued 
is largely dependent upon substantive rather than 
organizational considerations. If a decision were 
made, for example, to eliminate various restraints 
that now affect the various modes of transportation, 
the remaining regulatory controls might practicably 
be vested in a new agency structured differently from 
those now in existence. With respect to the other 
regulatory agencies, a major realignment of regu- 
latory responsibilities is not proposed and a con- 
vincing case has not as yet been made for replace- 
ment of the collegial form with a single admini- 
strator. " 
Annual Report, p. 61. 
RECYCLING THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 
John E, Moore, University of California, Santa Barbara 
There is a curious tendency, most recently 
exemplified in the Ash Council Report,1 to 
distinguish the shortcomings of the regulatory 
process from those of the political system of 
which it is a part, ascribe those shortcomings to 
the structural or procedural characteristics asso- 
ciated with the regulatory process, and then fail to 
distinguish the variety of functions performed by 
different regulatory agencies and the varied envi- 
ronments in which those functions are performed. 
This article proceeds from a rather different set 
of premises: 
* much of the malaise associated with the 
regulatory process can be attributed to the same 
forces that are responsible for increasing dis- 
affection from the political system generally 
* responses based almost exclusively upon 
structural or procedural reforms are more likely 
to compound than to reduce this disaffection, 
since they continue to confuse substance with 
process 
* as the Administrative Conference observed in its 
"Views" on the Ash Council Report, "whether 
an existing regulatory framework should or 
should not be continued is largely dependent 
upon substantive rather than organizational 
considerations"2 
* these substantive considerations vary with the 
nature of the policy area, regulatory function, 
and political environment 
* while changes in structure and procedure may 
improve the capacity of the "regulatory pro- 
cess" as a whole to cope with the varied 
problems it confronts, such changes should be 
near the bottom rather than at the top of our 
agenda. 
The least we can do to mark the end of an era is 
to fashion a new metaphor. "Recycling" implies a 
deliberate provision for invigorating and redefining 
the goals of the regulatory agencies, as contrasted 
with (1) the pessimistic metaphysical pathos of the 
"life cycle" metaphor that despairs of change in 
the absence of a jarring crisis in the regulated 
activity, or overwhelming evidence of senility in 
the regulatory agency, and (2) the excessive 
optimism of those who would have the regulatory 
agencies operating at an unremittingly feverish 
pitch. 
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